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THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUTTA 
HERE! MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL CITIES’ 
POTENTIAL TO BRING UNFAIR AND 
DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE CLAIM IN 





     It seems like something straight out of Hollywood.  The world has shut down, 
businesses have closed their doors, and people have been encouraged, and, in 
most cases, instructed to stay at home.1  In the wake of the novel COVID-19 
global pandemic, sports have become a past memory, rather than a present 
reality, as hundreds of sporting events across the world have been postponed or 
canceled.2  As the world wages its war against an unseen enemy, there persists 
another major battle behind the scenes in professional baseball; one not at the 
forefront of the news as of late, but nonetheless poised to have drastic 
implications for cities across the United States. 
     In the minds of most communities around the world, one of the most 
important assets it can possess is a local professional sports franchise.  After a 
city and an owner pour resources into the construction and maintenance of 
professional sports venues, they expect to see a return on their investment. 
 
 May 2020 graduate of Marquette University Law School with a Sports Law Certificate from the National 
Sports Law Institute. 2018-2019 member of the Marquette Sports Law Review. B.A. Sports Communication 
and Spanish Language, magna cum laude, 2017, Bradley University. This Article was written for an 
assignment in Professor Paul M. Anderson’s Sports Law Seminar Course and it was selected as the winner of 
the 2020 National Sports Law Student Writing Competition. He would like to thank Professor Anderson for 
all of his research suggestions and thoughtful edits throughout the writing process that helped get this paper 
to its final form. He also wants to thank his parents for their continued support throughout his academic career.  
     1 See Kaleigh Rogers, Why Did the World Shut Down for COVID-19 but Not Ebola, SARS or Swine Flu?, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 14, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-did-the-world-shut-down-for-
covid-19-but-not-ebola-sars-or-swine-flu/; See also Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu & Vanessa Swales, See Which 
States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html.  
      2 See Coronavirus Cancellations and Reactions in Sports, ESPN (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/28871525/coronavirus-cancellations-reactions-sports.  
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However, in the eyes of some, a local professional sports franchise can be a 
cumbersome detriment.  Take Minor League Baseball (“MiLB”), for example.  
When it comes to the minor leagues, MiLB and Major League Baseball 
(“MLB”) have staunch disagreements over its necessity and purpose. 
     The economics of MiLB are unusual and, as such, have led to a bifurcated 
arrangement between MiLB and MLB regarding finances involved in the 
operation of the minor leagues.3  As part of this agreement, MLB teams pay the 
salaries of their minor league affiliate’s players through affiliation contracts,4 
also known as Player Development Contracts (“PDC”).5  Concurrently, MiLB 
team owners are responsible for field maintenance and operation, team 
equipment, including uniforms and other “non-personnel operations.”6  This 
arrangement, however, has led MLB and MiLB to butt heads over the financial 
burden the other poses.  MLB believes that it pours “hundreds of millions of 
dollars” into what, in their eyes, is “an unprofitable enterprise” on expenses that 
primarily only benefit the minor leagues.7  Conversely, MiLB is unhappy with 
the millions of dollars it devotes to the instruction and development of tens of 
thousands of players for MLB action as required by a PDC.8 
     In recent months, the two leagues have been scuffling over the finances 
associated with MiLB, particularly the payment of players’ salaries.  Tensions 
have reached a boiling point, as MLB now threatens forty-two MiLB teams with 
losing their major league affiliation as part of its initiative to contract the minor 
leagues in an effort to limit operating costs.9  Cities currently home to minor 
league teams, as well as those looking to attract team teams, now look for relief 
in the face of MLB contraction.  Because MiLB and MLB work together, MLB 
is an authoritative voice to which MiLB, and its respective cities, look to for 
guidance in conforming to MLB’s standards and requirements for sustaining an 
affiliated team. 
     Accordingly, if a major league team wants its minor league affiliate’s field 
to have a similar layout, or match the dimensions of the field where the big-
league ball club plays, that hardship falls on the team owner and city to 
accomplish that feat by pouring resources into the construction of a park in 
compliance with the major league team’s request.  These cities rely on MLB’s 
word that an affiliated team, rather than an independent league team, will play 
 
     3 Michael McCann, Save the Spinners: How One Town Attempts to Stave Off MLB's Contractual Plan for 
the Minors, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/01/08/save-the-lowell-
spinners-controversial-plan-for-milb. 
     4 Id. 
     5 See Player Development Contracts, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, https://www.milb.com/about/pdc (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
     6 McCann, supra note 3. 
     7 Id. 
     8 Id. 
     9 Id. 
VIVERITO– ARTICLE 31.1 12/17/2020  8:51 PM 
2020]  MINOR LEAGUE CITIES & FTCA SECTION 5 CLAIMS  87 
 
 
at that stadium if the necessary measures are taken.10  Thus, in light of MiLB 
and its respective cities’ reliance on MLB guidance and dictation, there exists a 
potential claim of unfair or deceptive trade practices as a possibility for relief. 
     This article will examine United States federal law on unfair and deceptive 
trade practices in an effort to analyze the potential for MiLB cities to bring legal 
claims against MLB in light of contraction of the minor leagues.  First, Part I 
will explain the affiliation between MiLB and MLB before moving on to the 
current state of relations between the two leagues, including background on the 
main lawsuit central to this issue, as well as proposed legislation enacted by 
government officials.  Part I will conclude by identifying the MLB 
commissioner’s “best interest power,” which, while powerful within the game 
of baseball, is largely symbolic and holds little-to-no legal effect, meaning it 
would be defeated by any legal claim brought against it.  Next, Part II of this 
article will provide a detailed analysis of the elements required to establish 
liability under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act11 for an unfair or 
deceptive trade practice claim.  Part III will examine prior case law to identify 
comparable factual scenarios before applying the law to a fictitious city in order 
to weigh its potential to bring a claim under Section 5.  Finally, this article will 
conclude that, through a Section 5 analysis and prior case law review, a city 
would likely have standing to raise a lawsuit against MLB based on unfair or 
deceptive trade practices. 
I. THE SCOUTING REPORT 
     This section will introduce readers to former general manager Branch Rickey 
and explain how he revolutionized the minor leagues into what they are today.  
The relationship between the major-and-minor leagues exists through PDCs, an 
agreement between both leagues, giving both certain obligations to fulfill.  
Then, this section will present the reader with the legal saga created by the 
lawsuit of a former minor league player that led to the Save America’s Pastime 
Act (“SAPA”) and MLB’s exemption from federal labor laws.  Finally, the 
reader will learn about the “best interest power,” held only by the commissioner, 
and its viability as an available defense to MLB in its present legal battle.  
 
     10 Cf. Ballpark Digest Editors, 2019 Affiliated Attendance by Average, BALLPARK DIGEST (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://ballparkdigest.com/2019/09/09/2019-affiliated-attendance-by-average/ (League leading total 
attendance was 650,934 in 70 games, with an average of just under 9,300 fans per game); and Kevin Richard, 
2019 Independent Baseball Attendance by Average, BALLPARK DIGEST (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://ballparkdigest.com/2019/09/23/2019-independent-baseball-attendance-by-average/ (Comparable total 
attendance for 69 games was 344, 641, with an average of 5,385 fans per game). 
     11 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2020). 
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However, it will be demonstrated that this power has little-to-no legal relevance 
when applied to the issue at focus in this article. 
A. An Overview of MiLB 
     Even before minor league affiliation came about, a league separate from the 
major leagues had existed since 1901 with the formation of the National 
Association of Professional Baseball Leagues (“NAPBL”) in September of that 
year.12  Today, there are 160 MiLB teams dispersed throughout 17 different 
leagues around the United States, Canada, and the Dominican Republic.13  Full-
season minor league teams play a 140-game regular season from April to 
September, in addition to added time for spring training and the playoffs.14  
These teams are colloquially referred to as the “farm systems” for their MLB 
parent club because of their purpose to foster players in an effort to make them 
ready and capable for big-league action.15  In the early years of the NAPBL’s 
existence, major league teams did not utilize the existing league as a way to 
foster and develop players for use at the major league level.  That changed in 
1919 with then general manager of the St. Louis Cardinals, Branch Rickey, 
whose plan for a “farm system” called for Cardinal-owned teams at various 
minor league levels to develop players that would help the major league team.16  
This was only a plan in theory, however, as major league teams could neither 
purchase nor own a minor league team.  As luck would have it, the new National 
Association Agreement was signed in 1921, which permitted major league 
organizations to own minor league teams.17  Shortly thereafter, Rickey 
purchased three minor league teams to affiliate them with the big-league club 
and began loading them with talent to train and develop.18 
     Today, this affiliation is codified in the official MLB rulebook as Rule 56, 
which states, in part, “[F]or any Major League Club and any Minor League Club 
. . . to establish or maintain any form of working agreement or other contractual 
relationship, they both must sign a standard form letter . . . binding them both to 
the terms and conditions of the standard Player Development Contract . . . .”19  
 
     12 The History & Function of Minor League Baseball, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 
http://www.milb.com/milb/history/general_history.jsp (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (“The National Association 
of Professional Baseball Leagues, [is] now known as Minor League Baseball . . . .”).  
     13 About, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, https://www.milb.com/about (last visited Mar. 29, 2020).  
     14 See Minor League Baseball, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minor_League_Baseball (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
     15 Id. (stating that the “farm” comparison came from MLB players in the 1930 who joked that minor league 
teams were “growing players down on the farm like corn”).  
     16 Pat Doyle, Branch Rickey’s Farm, BASEBALL-ALMANAC, https://www.baseball-almanac.com/minor-
league/minor2005a.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
     17 Id. 
     18 Id. 
     19 The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, RULE 56 (2019), 
https://registration.mlbpa.org/pdf/MajorLeagueRules.pdf. 
VIVERITO– ARTICLE 31.1 12/17/2020  8:51 PM 
2020]  MINOR LEAGUE CITIES & FTCA SECTION 5 CLAIMS  89 
 
 
Players are then sent a Uniform Player Contract (“UPC”), which lays out the 
terms of their employment with their parent ball club.20  This creates a 
relationship between the player and the parent organization for seven years 
whereby the player remains subject to the major league club’s instructions year-
round, both in-season as well as during the offseason.21  Additionally, the PDC 
is the only working agreement permitted between MiLB and MLB.22  Thus, the 
PDC creates certain obligations for both MLB organizations and their affiliates’ 
players through the duration of the contractual relationship. 
     MiLB franchise ownership is charged with assembling a front office and staff 
to manage all business aspects, including gameday operations, which amount to 
ticket sales, promotion, and broadcasting, in addition to others.23  This allows 
MiLB teams to take in revenue from several different streams locally.24 MLB 
parent clubs, in turn, make all decisions related to roster assignment, coaching 
staff, and player development for each MiLB team it holds a PDC with.25  Most 
importantly in the scope of this article, major league clubs are responsible for 
the “payment of all obligations to or for the benefit of” minor league ball 
players.26 
     Most MiLB franchise owners are private individuals or ownership groups, 
while construction, ownership, and management of baseball stadiums are left to 
local municipalities.27  To put the cost of constructing a stadium into 
perspective, the Houston Astros’ Class A-Advanced affiliate, the Fayetteville 
Woodpeckers, saw the city of Fayetteville, Arkansas spend $37.8 million on its 
new stadium that opened in 2019.28  In High Point, North Carolina, the city 
constructed BB&T Point, the $36 million stadium29 where the High Point 
Rockers, a team in the independent league of unaffiliated baseball, play their 
 
     20 See, e.g., MINOR LEAGUE UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT (2020), https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/content/unh-
sports-law-repository-contracts-uniform-contracts (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).  
     21 Id. 
     22 The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book, supra note 19, at Rule 56(a). 
     23 Player Development Contracts, supra note 5. 
     24 Anne Wall, Sports Marketing and the Law: Protecting Proprietary Interests in Sports Entertainment 
Events, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 77, 95 (1996) (“Local revenues generated and maintained at the club . . . level 
include: (1) local television broadcasts made into the team’s ‘home territory;’ (2) local radio broadcasts; (3) 
season, group and individual ticket sales; (4) luxury box rental and preferred seating; (5) signage; (6) program 
sales; (7) local promotions; (8) concession; (9) parking; and (10) participant entry fees”); See also David 
Broughton, MiLB, Teams Had Record Merchandising Sales in 2018, SPORTS BUS. J. (Jul. 8, 2019), 
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2019/07/08/Research-and-Ratings/MiLB-
merchandise.aspx. (stating that all 160 clubs across MiLB brought in a combined $73.9 million in 
merchandising sales, which was up 4% from 2017.). 
     25 Player Development Contracts, supra note 5. 
     26 The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book, supra note 19, at Rule 56(g)(5)(A). 
     27 Player Development Contracts, supra note 5. 
     28 Monica Vendituoli, Baseball Stadium Budget Set at $37.8 Million, THE FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Mar. 
19, 2018), https://www.fayobserver.com/news/20180319/baseball-stadium-budget-set-at-378-million. 
     29 Lloyd Whittington, High Point Baseball Stadium has a Name, TRIAD BUS. J. (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/triad/news/2018/04/12/high-point-baseball-stadium-has-a-name.html.  
CRIPE – ARTICLE 31.1 12/17/2020  8:51 PM 
90 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:1 
home games.30  Prince William County in Virginia, where the former Potomac 
Nationals played their games, brought a public referendum to identify the source 
of funding for the construction of a new $35 million stadium that was to replace 
the current diminishing venue.31  The Pawtucket Red Sox wanted to do even 
more, this time asking fans for public funds to help construct a new $83 million 
stadium in 2017.32  In the financial breakdown of the bill for this proposed 
stadium the Triple-A team of the Boston Red Sox would be personally on the 
hook for $45 million, whereas the city and state, Pawtucket, Rhode Island, 
would both contribute a combined $38 million.33  Cities dedicate absorbent 
financial resources to stadiums that may be filled one year and vacant the next.  
Take the Pawtucket Red Sox in the example above; playing in Pawtucket, Rhode 
Island one year and Worcester, Massachusetts the next, where the city has a 
planned $100 million at its disposal to finance the new Polar Park.34  
     This article will now explain the current state of affairs in the relationship 
between MiLB and MLB.  As Part II will demonstrate, that relationship is now 
being tested like never before, especially with the looming threat of MLB 
contraction and the upcoming expiration of the current operating agreement 
between MiLB and MLB at the conclusion of the 2020 season.35 
B. Current State of Relations 
     Babe Ruth, Hank Aaron, Sandy Koufax, Ernie Banks, Mike Trout; these 
names all are synonymous with the game of baseball.  Fans attribute the names 
to what the individuals holding them accomplished on the field during their 
careers.  Aaron Senne is not a name one associates with baseball, nor is it one 
someone would hear and stop to think twice about.  Yet, in the coming years, it 
is possible that Aaron Senne becomes a name that, like those mentioned above, 
is forever linked with baseball history.  In this instance, however, the name will 
be linked to what a player has accomplished off the field, rather than his 
successes on it.  For Aaron Senne, his legacy will be having given minor 
leaguers a voice in the game of finances played by MiLB and MLB. 
 
     30 Eric Boehm, These Three Cities Spent $70 Million on Stadiums to Lure Minor League Baseball Teams. 
They All Struck Out., REASON (Apr. 1, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/04/01/70-million-minor-league-
stadium-fail/. 
     31 Jenna West, Are Minor League Parks a Bad Deal for Cities?, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2017/08/22/minor-league-parks-bad-deal-cities/591770001/.  
     32 Id. 
     33 Id. 
     34 Paul Burton, Worcester Expects to Borrow $32 Million for Ballpark Overruns, THE BOND BUYER (Jan. 
14, 2020), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/worcester-expects-to-borrow-32-million-for-ballpark-overruns.  
     35 Neil deMause, Why MLB Declared War on The Minor Leagues, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://slate.com/culture/2019/12/mlb-minor-league-baseball-contraction-kill-milb-teams-collusion.html.  
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     Aaron Senne was drafted three times as an amateur, once in high school, and 
twice in college.36  The third and final time, Senne signed with the Florida 
Marlins after being selected in the tenth round of the 2010 MLB Amateur 
Draft.37  Senne had an uninspiring minor league career, batting only .279 in 152 
games over a three-year career, never making it past Class A-Advanced.38  
While in the minor league system, Senne had first-hand experience with the 
working conditions imposed upon minor leaguers during the season and what 
the parent clubs expected from players in their development during the 
offseason.  Players work fifty to seventy hours per week during a five-month 
season, not including spring training,39 a camp held annually during the early 
months of the year in Florida and Arizona by each club before the official start 
of the regular season. Players in rookie ball and Class A receive minimum 
monthly salaries of $1,100, while players in Double-A and Triple-A earn $1,500 
and $2,150 per month respectively.40  Thus, many minor leaguers earn wages 
that place them at or below the federal poverty line.41  Compare that with the 
comfortable MLB minimum salary, $555,000 in 2019, and it is quite obvious 
why minor leaguers want to see some change when it comes to the payment for 
their services.42 
     In February 2014, Senne commenced an action against the Office of the 
Commissioner of Baseball (the “Senne suit”).43  Dubbed a “‘first-of-its-kind’ 
challenge to MLB’s minor league pay practices,”44 the principle point asserted 
was that MLB violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by, “failing to 
pay minor league players in accordance with federal minimum-wage and 
overtime rules during the regular season,” and by, “failing to pay these same 
players anything at all for their participation in spring training, fall instructional 
leagues, and mandatory off-season workout programs.”45  In its brief history, 
the Senne suit’s existence has been tumultuous, going from certification in 
 
     36 Aaron Senne, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-reference.com/register/player.fcgi?id=senne-001aar (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2020). 
     37 Id. 
     38 See Id. 
     39 Theodore McDowell, Changing the Game: Remedying the Deficiencies of Baseball’s Antitrust 
Exemption in the Minor Leagues, 9 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 2 (2018). 
     40 Ronald Blum, Baseball Players in Minors to Lose Minimum Wage Protection, ASSOC. PRESS NEWS 
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://apnews.com/cb183f59e88948e8b9cd49ad07bde807/Baseball-players-in-minors-to-
lose-minimum-wage-protection. 
     41 Nathaniel Grow, The Save America’s Pastime Act: Special-Interest Litigation Epitomized, 90 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2019). See generally 2018 Poverty Guidelines, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, https://aspe.hhs.gov/2018-poverty-guidelines (last visited Apr. 6, 2020) 
(stating that the federal poverty line for single-person households in 2018 was $12,140). 
     42 Scott Boeck, MLB Salaries: The All-Near-League Minimum Team, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2019/03/29/mlb-salaries-league-minimum-
baseball/3306763002/.  
     43 Grow, supra note 41, at 1016–17. 
     44 Id. at 1017. 
     45 Id. 
CRIPE – ARTICLE 31.1 12/17/2020  8:51 PM 
92 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:1 
October 2015, to decertification in July 2016, back to certification in March 
2017.46  In August 2019, the Ninth Circuit heard the case, affirming class 
certification and remanding it back to the California district court with further 
instructions relating to choice of law for the certified class.47 
     As of the time of this writing, the suit has not been argued on its merits, and 
judicial treatment of the issues has been unpredictable at best.48  During early 
litigation, however, MLB argued two key defenses – the Seasonal Amusement 
and Recreation Establishment Defenses and the Creative Professional 
Exemption.49  These defenses argue the nature and business of MLB cause it to 
be exempted from FLSA compliance.50  Because the issue of FLSA exemption 
is both a present and future problem, coupled with the uncertainty of how a court 
will rule on the merits of the Senne suit, MLB looked “to find other mechanisms 
through which it could insulate its minor league pay practices from legal 
challenge under the FLSA.”51 
     In 2016, the Save America’s Pastime Act (“SAPA”) was first introduced by 
Rep. Brett Guthrie of Kentucky and Rep. Cheri Bustos of Illinois,52 exempting 
MLB from the minimum wage and overtime hours language contained in the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.53  This legislation was initially broad, applying to 
“any employee” who held a contract with an affiliated team to play baseball at 
the minor league level and completely excluded minor league baseball players 
from the minimum wage and overtime laws contained in the FLSA.54  In the 
eyes of the public, however, this was another example of a multi-billion dollar 
corporation looking to minimize payments to employees, while increasing their 
hours of labor.  As one author put it, “[t]he prospect of Congress passing a 
legislative exemption shielding MLB . . . from the legal obligation to pay some 
of its employees the minimum wage triggered a wave of outcry . . . .”55  Criticism 
over the SAPA and the public backlash it received caused the bill to wilt away 
in the House of Representatives throughout the remaining term of the 114th 
Congress.56 
 
     46 McDowell, supra note 39, at 14. 
     47 Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 950 (9th Cir. 2019); See also Maury Brown, 
Court Ruling Allows Minor League Baseball Players to Seek Wage Increase as Class Action, FORBES (Aug. 
16, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/08/16/court-ruling-allows-minor-league-
baseball-players-to-seek-wage-increase-as-class-action/#1ff2e8077fed (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision to affirm and remand back to the Northern District of California). 
     48 McDowell, supra note 39, at 13. 
     49 Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 315 F.R.D. 523, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
     50 Id. 
     51 Grow, supra note 41, at 1023. 
     52 McCann, supra note 3. 
     53 H.R. 5580, 114th Cong. (2016). 
     54 See id. 
     55 Grow, supra note 41, at 1026. 
     56 Id. at 1028. 
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     It was not until 2018 that the SAPA saw light again.  This time, the language 
contained a slightly more tailored exemption than its predecessor.57  Under the 
bill, a minor league baseball player would be exempt from additional pay 
requirements only if his weekly salary was greater than the current equivalent 
of a minimum wage forty–hour work week during the championship season (not 
to include the off season or spring training).58  That is to say, so long as players 
earned a minimum salary of at least $290 per week during the 2018 
championship season, they would not be entitled to any additional 
compensation, overtime or otherwise, even if they worked more than forty hours 
in a single week.59  However, there was one notable difference between the 2016 
and 2018 versions of the SAPA.  The 2016 version included language that would 
have negated the claims raised in the Senne suit.60  That language was removed 
in the 2018 version, thus preserving the issues maintained by the suit.61  On 
March 23, 2018, President Donald Trump signed into law Congress’s $1.3 
trillion omnibus spending legislation, codifying MLB’s labor laws exemption.62 
     This is not the first statutory exemption enjoyed by MLB, however.  In the 
1922 landmark Supreme Court case, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. 
National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs,63 Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes held that the business of baseball was purely state affairs, and thus not 
interstate commerce.64  Through this holding, Justice Holmes effectively created 
MLB’s antitrust exemption.65  This exemption has stood the test of time, 
remaining intact through several judicial challenges.66  In addition to both the 
antitrust and FLSA exemptions, the judicial system has also faced another 
pressing issue – one not just inherent to baseball. 
 
 
     57 Id. at 1029. 
     58 H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. § 201 (2018). 
     59 Grow, supra note 41, at 1029. 
     60 H.R. 5580, 114th Cong. § 2(b) (2016) (subsection (f) is amended to state, “In any action or proceeding 
commenced before, on, or after the date of enactment . . . .”). 
     61 H.R. 1625, 115th  Cong. § 201(b) (2018) (title takes effect the date upon which the law is enacted). 
     62 See Mike Murphy, Here’s Why These Baseball Players May Suffer from the $1.3 Trillion Spending Bill, 
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-why-these-baseball-players-
may-strike-out-if-congress-passes-the-spending-bill-2018-03-22.  
     63 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Pro. Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
     64 Id. at 208-09. 
     65 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2020) (“Every contact, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 
(emphasis added)). 
     66 See Toolson v. N.Y.  Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (stating that pursuant to the decision in Federal 
Baseball Club, “Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the Federal 
antitrust laws”); See also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (stating that while the Court ruled that baseball 
is, in fact, “engaged in interstate commerce,” baseball’s antitrust exemption will persist nonetheless because 
of its longevity and the Court’s respect for stare decisis, and will continue to apply solely to baseball). 
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C. The Commissioner’s “Best Interests” Power 
     In 1921, with newly appointed MLB Commissioner Kennesaw Mountain 
Landis at the helm of the league, team owners signed the National Agreement, 
also referred to as the Major League Agreement, which defined and preserved 
the authority of the MLB commissioner.67  Within this document was language 
granting the commissioner broad power “[t]o investigate either upon complaint 
or upon his own initiative, any act, transaction or practice charged, alleged or 
suspected to be detrimental to the best interests of the national game of base ball 
[sic]. . . .”68  After Landis’ death in 1944, the scope of the “best interests” powers 
was narrowed with the inclusion of Article I, Section 3: “No Major League Rule 
or other joint action of the [American and National Leagues], and no action or 
procedure taken in compliance with any such Major League Rule or joint action 
of the [American and National Leagues] . . . shall be considered or construed to 
be detrimental to Baseball.”69  Additionally, this amendment to the original 
National Agreement eliminated the clubs’ right of judicial recourse to challenge 
a decision by the commissioner.70  In 1964, after Commissioner Ford Frick’s 
retirement, the agreement was amended once more to restore the club’s right to 
judicial recourse.71  The agreement was later renamed the Major League 
Baseball Constitution in 2000, but the nature and scope of the commissioner’s 
“best interests” powers has remained substantively the same since the 1964 
amendment.72 
     Perhaps the most notable case in which the Court has addressed the 
commissioner’s “best interests” power is Charles O. Finely & Co. v. Kuhn.73  
Here, the Seventh Circuit upheld that  Commissioner Bowie Kuhn’s rejection 
of the Oakland Athletics’ assignment of three player contracts to the Boston Red 
Sox and New York Yankees as, “inconsistent with the best interests of baseball, 
the integrity of the game and the maintenance of public confidence in it.”74  In 
its decision, the Court concluded that Commissioner Kuhn, after investigation, 
consultation, and deliberation, acted in good faith in a manner he determined to 
be in the best interests of baseball, and, further, that whether he was right or 
wrong in his decision was beyond the competence and jurisdiction of the 
 
     67 See Ted Curtis, In the Best Interests of the Game: The Authority of the Commissioner of Major League 
Baseball, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 7-8 (1995). 
     68 1921 Major League Agreement, Article I, Section 2(a), ROADSIDEPHOTOS, 
http://roadsidephotos.sabr.org/baseball/1921MLAgree.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2020). 
     69 Allan H. (“Bud”) Selig & Matthew J. Mitten, Baseball Jurisprudence: Its Effect on America’s Pastime 
and Other Professional Sports Leagues, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1171, 1173 (2018). 
     70 Id. 
     71 Id.  
     72 Id. at 1174. 
     73 Charles O. Finely & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978). 
     74 Id. at 531. 
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Court.75  To reinforce its decision, the Court followed up by stating that when 
baseball selected Kennesaw Mountain Landis, a federal judge, as its first 
commissioner, “it intended only him and not the judiciary as a whole to be its 
umpire and governor.”76  This small but powerful statement shows that the 
courts intended to stay out of the game of baseball and leave its governance and 
rule enforcement to the league itself. 
     The MLB commissioner generally has broad discretion when it comes to his 
“best interests” power, and courts will usually provide “substantial deference” 
to the commissioner’s final judgment.77  Interestingly, though, in the last few 
sentences of the opinion, the Court appears to place a limit on the 
commissioner’s powers by stating that judicial intervention is appropriate in 
certain circumstances when “the rules, regulations, or judgments . . . are in 
[direct] contravention to the laws of the land or in [complete] disregard of the 
charter or bylaws of the [NAPBL] and where the [NAPBL] has failed to follow 
the basic [freedom] of due process of law.”78  Thus, courts recognize and enforce 
limits on the “best interests” power with contractual, due process, and public 
law disputes.79 
     As an example, in 1976, Commissioner Kuhn revoked the first round 
selection of the Atlanta Braves in the upcoming January 1977 amateur draft 
because of two counts of tampering that violated the Major League Rules.80  In 
its analysis of the legal implication of revoking Atlanta’s draft pick, the Court 
inquired into the applicability of the Major League Agreement, which 
enumerated the punitive measures the commissioner may take, and found that 
revocation of a draft pick was not one of the measures specifically enumerated 
by the language of the agreement.81  What this demonstrates is that the 
commissioner’s “best interests” power is not the end all, be all when it comes to 
its enforcement. 
     Thus, while the commissioner’s “best interests” power is valid, enforceable, 
and carries weight through judicial deference, there are certain situations in 
which the judiciary will intervene and contradict the commissioner’s verdict, 
 
     75 Id. at 539. 
     76 Id. at 537. 
     77 Selig & Mitten, supra note 69, at 1174. 
     78 Finely, 569 F.2d at 544.  
     79 Selig & Mitten, supra note 69 at 1175; see Finely, 569 F.2d at 544 n.65 (stating that while issuing 
disciplinary authority pursuant to his “best interests” power, the commissioner’s process and reason behind 
the implementation of discipline “must not be a sham designed merely to give colorable proprietary to an 
inadequate process”). 
     80 Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1216–17 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
     81 Id. at 1223. (stating that the commissioner has the following remedial measures at his disposal: “(a) a       
reprimand; (b) deprivation of a Major League Club of representation in joint meetings; (c) suspension or 
removal of any officer or employee of a Major League or a Major League Club; (d) temporary or permanent 
ineligibility of a player; and (e) a fine, not to exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in the case of a Major 
League Club and not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) in the case of any officer, employee or 
player”). 
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especially when the suggested remedial measure is not enumerated in the Major 
League Baseball Constitution, thus making the power largely “a symbolic 
hammer.”82  In application to the focus of this article – MLB contraction of 
MiLB teams – and following the footsteps of Atlanta National League Baseball 
Club, Inc. and the final sentences of the Finely decision, it is more likely that 
the commissioner’s “best interests” power would be defeated via judiciary 
intervention because contraction is not an enumerated power available to the 
commissioner and, consequently, will not be addressed further in this article. 
II. THE DRAFT: SELECTING THE LAW 
 
Sports provide a sense of comfort and relief from the stresses that 
continually arise in everyday life.  People eagerly anticipate the opportunity to 
get lost in their favorite teams when game time rolls around.  Athletes become 
more than people playing a game; they become idols.  Fans purchase player 
merchandise, team apparel, tickets, and, when inside stadiums and arenas, food 
and beverage.  With this in mind, it is not hard to understand that the “business 
of professional sports is driven by sports consumers.”83  Accordingly, when 
certain actions taken by an individual player or team “strike a particularly unfair 
chord,” many fans feel that their stake is legally cognizable.84 
     While the states have individually codified their own unfair competition and 
deceptive trade practice statutes, this article will address solely the federal 
statute, the Federal Trade Commission Act Section 5 (“Section 5”),85 so as to 
keep uniformity in its analysis.  The primary purpose of this federal statute is to 
“protect the consumer public, rather than to punish the wrongdoer.”86  Section 
5 has long prohibited “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”87  
Additionally, Section 5 empowers the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to 
prevent certain entities from engaging in behavior that constitutes “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”88   
Only the FTC is authorized by statute to bring challenges under Section 5.89  
When faced with an unfairness claim, the FTC must consider three factors in 
 
     82 Howard Bryant, Bud Selig’s Best Interests in Alex Rodriguez Case, ESPN (Aug. 14, 2013), 
https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/9568200/bud-selig-best-interests-alex-rodriguez-case (discussing Alex 
Rodriguez’s PED punishment and the role that the “best interest” power could play). 
     83 Tayler W. Tibbitts, Sports Consumers: Ticket-Holding Fans’ Rights in Light of “Spursgate,” 21 SPORTS 
L. J. 201, 204 (2014). 
     84 Id. 
     85 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2020). 
     86 F.T.C. v. Affiliate Strategies, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1104 (D. Kan. 2011). 
     87 F.T.C. v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2001). 
     88 Orkin Exterminating Co. v. F.T.C., 849 F.2d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1988). 
     89 Richard Craswell, The Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices by the Federal Trade Commission, 
1981 WIS. L. REV. 107, 115 (1981). 
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deciding whether to wield its authority:90 Whether an act or practice “(1) caused 
consumers, competitors, or other businesses substantial injury; (2) offended 
public policy as established by statute, the common law, or otherwise; and (3) 
was immoral, unethical, or unscrupulous.”91  In determining whether an act or 
practice is unfair, the FTC may “consider established public policies as evidence 
to be considered along with all other evidence,” but may not serve as the primary 
basis for such determination.92  There must still be a showing that the act or 
practice alleged to have caused the injury is unfair under a “well-established 
legal standard, whether grounded in statute, the common law, or the 
Constitution.”93 
There are two related doctrines that appear in a Section 5 analysis: the 
unfairness doctrine and the deception doctrine.94  This section will analyze both 
doctrines and will provide the black letter law that will then be applied to Part 
III’s analysis of a hypothetical city facing MLB contraction.  The case law is 
extremely limited as applicable to the issue addressed by this article.  However, 
that does not mean an analysis may not be undertaken.  There are examples 
within case law that may be extracted in order to aid in Part III’s analysis.  Thus, 
in an effort to demonstrate how a current analysis over unfair and deceptive 
trade practice claims would play out, it is necessary to look selectively at facts, 
in addition to the black letter law, that may shed light on Section 5’s 
applicability in a challenge brought by minor league baseball cities. 
A. The Unfairness Doctrine 
     The FTC has identified four separate circumstances in which the act or 
practice by the seller is inherently unfair: “(a) withholding material information, 
(b) making unsubstantiated advertising claims, (c) depriving consumers of 
various post-purchase rights, and (d) using various high-pressure sales 
techniques.”95  The most frequent category of practices found by the FTC to be 
unfair, and most material to the issue at focus in this article, involves a seller 
withholding material information.96  A finding of unfairness under this category 
focuses on the benefits of information in improving the market’s performance, 
“regardless of whether consumers who lacked that information could said to be 
deceived.”97  In essence, the failure to disclose material information amounts to 
unfairness if consumers currently lack the information, which may be 
 
     90 LabMD, Inc. v. F.T.C., 894 F.3d 1221, 1228 (11th Cir. 2018). 
     91 Id. 
     92 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2020); See LabMD, 849 F.3d at 1129 n.24. 
     93 Id. 
     94 See infra Parts II.A., II.B. 
     95 Craswell, supra note 89, at 108–09. 
     96 Id. at 116. 
     97 Id. at 117. 
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accomplished through direct evidence or testimony, if consumers would choose 
differently if better informed, and if the benefits of better consumer decisions 
and improved seller performance are not outweighed by the costs of supplying 
the information.98 
     Specific to the topic at issue in this article, if an act or practice is not 
inherently unfair due to the withholding material information, then an analysis 
must be undertaken to identify whether the particular act or practice is unfair 
pursuant to Section 5.  For the purpose of analysis, it will be assumed that the 
facts at issue do not amount to being inherently unfair in order to demonstrate 
the applicability of an unfairness doctrine under Section 5.  In an unfairness 
analysis, proof of intent, negligence, fraud, consumer reliance, or proof of injury 
is not required to establish that a particular act or practice is unfair.99   For the 
FTC to justify a finding of unfairness, the injury must satisfy three tests.100  The 
first test recognizes that the injury must be substantial.101  In most cases, 
substantial injury would involve monetary harm, as emotional impact and other 
more subjective types of harm ordinarily would not make a practice unfair.102  
Yet, sometimes, an injury may be sufficiently substantial if it raises a significant 
risk of concrete harm.103  Although unfairness claims normally “involve actual 
and completed harms,” they may also be brought on the basis of likely injury, 
or foreseeable future injury, rather than actual present injury.104 
     In the second test, the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing 
benefits to consumers or competition that the allegedly unfair practice 
produces.105  The FTC will not find a practice to have unfairly injured consumers 
unless it is injurious in its net effects, thus making a single, isolated instance of 
 
     98 Id. at 119, 123. 
     99 F.T.C. v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005); Michael Flynn, “The Lie, the 
Bigger Lie, and the Biggest Lie” –Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices of TripAdvisor and Other Online 
Review Websites, 36 J.L. & COM. 23, 30-31 (2017). 
     100 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 244 (3rd Cir. 2015). 
     101 Id. 
     102 Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n v. F.T.C., 767 F.2d 957, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1985); See also Orkin Exterminating Co. 
v. F.T.C., 849 F.2d 1354, 1364-65 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that harm from defendant’s unilateral increase in 
prices, previously specified in contracts as fixed annual renewal fees, violated the terms of the contract in that 
customers were charged with increased costs of services previously bargained for and the loss of certainty of 
fixed prices, thus satisfying the first prong of the unfairness doctrine’s requirement of a substantial injury); 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 245, (“A company does not act equitably wen it publishes a privacy 
policy to attract customers who are concerned about data privacy, fails to make good on that promise by 
investing inadequate resources in cybersecurity, exposes its unsuspecting customers to substantial injury, and 
retains the profits of their business”). 
     103 Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n, 767 F.2d at 972 (explaining that a concrete injury is found when an injury actually 
exists or if there is a real chance of harm). 
     104 Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 246 (quoting In the Matter of Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 
949, 1061 (1984)). 
     105 Id. at 244. 
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harm incapable for a finding of unfair injury.106  This turns into a cost-benefit 
analysis, one in which the FTC weighs the potential costs that the proposed 
remedy would impose on the parties and society in general against the overall 
benefit that may be experienced by such remedies.107 
     Finally, the third test undertaken by the FTC in an unfairness analysis hinges 
on whether the injury is one that consumers could not have reasonably 
avoided.108  A consequence is “reasonably avoidable” if people not only 
understand the physical steps needed to be taken in order to prevent it, but also 
whether they understand the necessity of actually taking those steps.109  This 
focus on a consumer’s ability to reasonably avoid injury has developed from the 
FTC’s general reliance on free and informed consumer choice that stems from 
the availability of all relevant, material information thus making such 
information the best regulator of the market.110  If consumers have a reason to 
anticipate any impending harm they may act to avoid injury, should they have 
the means to; otherwise, they may seek subsequent mitigation.111 
     With the three tests conducted by the FTC in an unfairness analysis outlined, 
focus will now shift to the second way the FTC may find a specific act or 
practice to be in violation of the FTCA: the deceptive doctrine. 
B. The Deceptive Doctrine 
     Under Section 5 deception is present either if the seller affirmatively 
misrepresents the product to consumers, or if the product differs materially from 
the consumers’ reasonable expectations about the product and the seller fails to 
disclose that difference.112  Misrepresentations of material facts made for the 
purpose of inducing consumers to purchase services or products form the basis 
of unfair or deceptive trade practices prohibited under Section 5.113  While there 
is some overlap between both the unfairness and the deceptive doctrines, there 
is one distinct difference: “A practice is deceptive when the consumer is forced 
to bear a larger risk than expected” (i.e., the consumer believes one outcome 
 
     106 Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n, 767 F.2d at 975; See also Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1365 (stating that 
the FTC has noted that acts or practices may result in a “mixture of both beneficial and adverse 
consequences”). 
     107 Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n., 767 F.2d at 975; See also Orkin Exterminating Co. Inc., 849 F.2d at 1365 (holding 
that the second prong of the unfairness doctrine was met when defendant’s increase in fee was not 
accompanied by an increase in the level or quality of service provided). 
     108 Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 244. 
     109 Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 849 F.2d at 1366 (quoting In the Matter of Int’l Harvester Co., 104 
F.T.C. at 1066). 
     110 Id. at 1365. 
     111 See id. at 1365-1366 (stating that anticipatory avoidance was not possible because neither defendant nor 
contracts gave any indication renewal fees would increase, and that mitigation was not possible because 
accommodation program was only available to customers who complained about increases in renewal fees). 
     112 Craswell, supra note 89, at 116-17. 
     113 F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 630 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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will occur and is misled, thus bringing about an outcome the consumer did not 
expect upon entering into the purchase agreement), “whereas a practice is unfair 
when the consumer is forced to bear a larger risk than an efficient market would 
require,” (i.e., a normal level of risk allotted to consumers in a freely operating 
economy).114  In other words, when a consumer is misled, there will be a finding 
for deception, rather than unfairness, in the trade practice or act.115  “[T]he 
‘cardinal factor' in determining whether an act or practice is deceptive under §5 
is the likely [net] effect the promotor’s handiwork will have on the mind of the 
ordinary consumer.”116  The more influence the promotor/seller has over the 
decision of the reasonable consumer to that consumer’s detriment, the more 
likely there will be a finding that the trade practice or act is considered 
deceptive.  Thus, at the heart of a deception case lies the central inquiry of 
whether the seller, either explicitly or implicitly, made false or misleading 
claims, or whether consumers were left with incorrect expectations after the 
purchase agreement has been validated.117  Additionally, the FTC will find that 
ambiguous, confusing, or even inconsistent statements have the tendency or 
capacity to deceive.118 
     To prove that an act or practice is deceptive in violation of Section 5, the 
FTC must prove that there was a representation, omission, or practice, which is 
likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and 
such a representation, omission, or practice is material.119  Intent to deceive is 
not a required element for a finding of deception under Section 5; it is sufficient 
that the representations or practices were likely to mislead consumers acting 
reasonably under similar circumstances.120  Furthermore, although proof of 
actual deception is not necessary to establish that the practice or act is in 
“violation of Section 5, such proof is highly probative to show that [it] is likely 
to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.”121 
     For the purposes of this article, only a representation and an omission are 
relevant and will be discussed.  A “representation” is defined as “a statement or 
account made to influence opinion or action.”122 An “omission” is “something 
[that is] neglected or left undone.”123  Thus, for a finding that a representation 
was made in satisfaction of the first factor of the deceptive doctrine, one must 
only show that a statement was made that influenced the recipient of the 
 
     114 Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n v. F.T.C., 767 F.2d 957, 979 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
     115 Id. 
     116 F.T.C. v. Affiliate Strategies, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1104 (D. Kan. 2011). 
     117 Craswell, supra note 89, at 117. 
     118 Michael Flynn, “You Know, It’s Just Marketing” – Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices in Car Dealer 
Buy-Back Offers, 42 U. DAYTON L. REV. 11, 18 (2017). 
     119 F.T.C. v. Moses, 913 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2019). 
     120 F.T.C. v. Verity Intern., Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2006). 
     121 F.T.C. v. USA Financial, LLC, 415 Fed. Appx. 970, 973 (11th Cir. 2011). 
     122 Representation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2011). 
     123 Omission, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2011). 
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representation.  For an omission to occur, there must be something of substance 
that was not included or left out, either intentionally or otherwise. 
     “In demonstrating that a representation is likely to mislead, the FTC must 
establish that (1) such a representation was false or (2) [that] the advertiser 
lacked a reasonable basis for its claims.”124  Courts will find that a representation 
had a reasonable basis if it had some “recognizable substantiation for the 
representation prior to making it.”125  An omission is likely to mislead 
consumers if its inclusion would have properly informed the reasonable 
consumer about certain risks associated that would have otherwise been 
unknown before entering into an agreement with the seller, but was left off to 
induce the sale to the seller’s benefit. 
     A representation is material if a reasonable prospective consumer is likely to 
rely on the representation, thus making it likely to affect the consumer’s decision 
to purchase a product or service.126  The same goes for an omission.  In this same 
light, “a solicitation may be likely to mislead by virtue of the net impression” it 
creates, even if there are certain truthful disclosures contained within.127  
Further, “[a] representation does not become ‘false and deceptive’ merely 
because it will be unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and 
unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom the representation is 
addressed.”128 
     While proof of consumer reliance is not required for a finding that a practice 
or act violates Section 5, it is necessary to establish the consumer’s right to 
redress.129  In that instance, to raise a presumption of reliance, the FTC need 
only show “the business entity made material misrepresentations likely to 
deceive consumers, . . . those misrepresentations were widely disseminated, and 
. . . consumers purchased the entity’s products.”130 
     Having now gone through an explanation of the black letter, along with 
seeing examples in case law for how courts have navigated both the unfairness 
 
     124 F.T.C. v. John Beck Amazing Profits, LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
     125 Id. 
     126 F.T.C. v. NPB Advert., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1358 (M.D. Fla. 2016); F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, 
Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 631 (6th Cir. 2014); see also F.T.C. v. Verity Intern., Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(finding that defendants engaged in “representation of uncontestability” when they caused subscribers to 
receive explicit and implicit representations regarding the inability to avoid charges for the download of a 
program used to purchase adult entertainment); F.T.C. v. Medlab, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 
2009) (stating that the representations were material because they addressed “critical information intended to 
affect consumers’ choice to purchase defendants’ product”). 
     127 F.T.C. v. Cyberspace.Com LLC, 453, F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006); see also E.M.A. Nationwide, 
Inc., 767 F.3d at 633 (finding that scripts used by defendants to solicit consumers in initial phone calls 
consisted “almost entirely” of material representations which actually induced consumers into purchasing 
defendants’ services at high costs, even though there were truthful disclosures buried in subsequent 
communications). 
     128 Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging 
the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 824 (2011). 
     129 E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d at 631 n.12. 
     130 Id. 
CRIPE – ARTICLE 31.1 12/17/2020  8:51 PM 
102 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:1 
and the deceptive doctrines, this article will now shift to Part III’s application to 
a hypothetical city facing MLB contraction to weigh the likelihood of that city 
having a legitimate claim against MLB. 
III. STEPPING UP TO THE PLATE 
 
     The following facts will be pertinent to Part III’s analysis: The city of Alpha 
has been in talks with MLB to bring a MiLB team, that played last season in the 
city of Bravo, into town, as it is something the city believes will be a positive 
addition and a boost to the economy since its last team’s departure several years 
ago.131  Because the stadium is not currently suited to MLB’s liking for MiLB 
play in Alpha, city leadership has been informed by MLB that an extensive 
overhaul of the existing stadium and facilities will be required in order for the 
team to come and play its games therein.  Because of this, Alpha must pour 
finances into the reconstruction of the stadium site in compliance with MLB’s 
request, even when MLB keeps pushing more additions to the stadium site that 
increase costs for Alpha.  MLB has approved designs submitted by city 
leadership and has repeatedly given assurances to Alpha that, following 
adherence to these approved plans, Alpha will acquire a MiLB team and be able 
to market the team as an MLB affiliate.  Unbeknownst to Alpha, however, the 
team originally located in Bravo is one of the forty-two set to lose MLB 
affiliation through contraction.  While contraction is not a certainty, there is 
widespread internal belief through the MLB that contraction is inevitable, with 
a concurrent plan for its execution in development. 
     Because Section 5 of the FTCA is, “phrased in the disjunctive, prohibiting 
‘unfair or deceptive’ acts or practices,” the FTC is not required to prove 
violation under both the unfairness and deceptive doctrine in order to obtain 
relief.132  Once one has been proven, the FTC has met its burden.  However, for 
the sake of argument in this article, both doctrines will be applied to the facts. 
A. The Unfairness Doctrine Applied 
     In analyzing the most frequent category of practices found by the FTC to be 
unfair, withholding material information, the central focus of this article meets 
the legal threshold determined by the FTC through previous challenges.  Here, 
city officials currently lack the critical information that the team from Bravo 
they are looking to bring to the city is one of the forty-two proposed for 
contraction.  This may be easily achieved through direct evidence via emails, 
text messages, proposals, etc., that will prove MLB never divulged information 
 
     131 The previous team that played in Alpha had no MLB affiliation, and is considered a part of the 
Independent League. As such, the stadium has limited capacity and lackluster facilities for training. 
     132 F.T.C. v. Verity Intern., Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 65 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). 
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that the incoming team was up for contraction.  There is no doubt that city 
officials in Alpha would choose differently had they been informed.  As has 
been demonstrated earlier in this article, the costs associated with stadium 
construction and maintenance are high.  City officials have the difficult task in 
appropriating funds throughout different projects and causes within.  Had they 
been informed of the inevitable contraction of their team, the money allocated 
for stadium construction would undoubtedly have been reallocated to other 
areas in Alpha.  Lastly, the costs of supplying the information does not outweigh 
the benefits of better consumer decisions and improved seller performance.  
Supplying this information simply means making Alpha city officials aware that 
the team they are taking on is facing contraction, which would unquestionably 
bring about a better decision for them in deciding how to allocate funds.  
However, simply stating that this issue fits the mold of the most frequent 
category of practices found to be unfair would not be wise, as courts have been 
known to be unpredictable.  Thus, further analysis will be conducted under the 
unfairness doctrine to reinforce the idea that the acts or practices on MLB’s part 
are considered unfair pursuant to Section 5 of the FTCA. 
     Applying the first test under the unfairness doctrine, which necessitates that 
the injury suffered be substantial, it is clear that Alpha’s harm meets this 
threshold.  As has been stated in this article, the construction of stadiums for 
MiLB consistently requires tremendous capital contribution from cities.  
Because, in most cases, substantial injury involves monetary harm, the monetary 
commitment made by Alpha towards the redesign and reconstruction of its 
stadium meant for MiLB play is no simple waste.  This is capital that could have 
otherwise been applied to other projects or causes in the city, but is no longer 
available because of its waste on a stadium that will no longer house a MiLB 
team. 
     On the contrary view, while the money may be found to not have been 
wasted, thus calling into question the validity of the substantial injury threshold, 
one must contemplate the overall effect of losing a MiLB team.  However, since 
an unfairness claim may also be brought on the basis of likely harm, as opposed 
to actual harm, there is likely harm Alpha will suffer vis-à-vis its return on 
investment.  The draw of a MiLB team is seeing your team’s prized prospects 
play and develop before they are called up to big league action.  MiLB games 
also provide out-of-market fans the opportunity to see veteran players who may 
be with the team for a rehab assignment before they are declared healthy and 
suited for a return to their big-league ball club.  Once inside the stadium, fans 
purchase food and beverage, as well as visit gift shops to player apparel of 
aspiring big leaguers.  Further, drawing in fans to the stadium may become 
more, as families may decide to make a weekend trip out of it and spend time in 
the nearby downtown center of the city, where they will purchase lodging, 
meals, and pursue further entertainment, thus contributing further to the city’s 
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economy.  Take these crucial components of MiLB away and the draw is not 
the same for an independent league team. 
     Accordingly, because Alpha must contribute capital to the redesign and 
reconstruction of its stadium to meet MLB’s standard for a MiLB affiliated team 
to play its games therein, the actual or likely harm Alpha will be subject to, 
should MLB contract the promised team, is substantial enough to satisfy the 
threshold established by the first test under the unfairness doctrine. 
     Next, the injury to Alpha is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits 
to consumers or competition that contraction produces.  MLB contraction would 
be injurious in its net effects due to the harm that comes not only to the city for 
lost capital, but for other industries around the city.  The money that was devoted 
to the redesign and reconstruction of Alpha’s stadium site could have been 
allocated to other causes within the city, such as public works, education, law 
enforcement, etc.  Fans that would be in town taking in a ball game would no 
longer be there to venture out into the downtown area and spend their money.  
This harms not only Alpha’s treasury, but all those who rely on the several 
different industries that enable a city to operate and generate revenue. 
     Along the same thinking, a cost-benefit analysis turns in favor of Alpha, as 
well.  The detriment experienced by the city and those relying on essential 
services and maintenance far outweighs the benefit experienced by MLB upon 
contraction.  Citizens of Alpha would experience tax increases to recover lost 
funds and profit expected from having an affiliated team playing its games in 
the city.  Thus, Alpha can be said to have satisfied the second test under the 
unfairness doctrine in that there are no countervailing benefits to Alpha and its 
citizens as a result of MLB contraction. 
     In the final test under the unfairness doctrine, the FTC must prove that Alpha 
could not have reasonably avoided or mitigated the injury.  There appears to be 
no issue proving that Alpha could not have reasonably avoided injury in this 
instance.  The harm comes from losing a team with MLB affiliation, the draw 
such a team brings to the stadium, and the money spent by those crowds and 
generated from advertising.  This draw is unique to MiLB due to, as explained 
above, the irreplaceable opportunity fans get to see some of their favorite players 
and potential superstars for their clubs.  The hypothetical facts indicate that 
MLB is actively working on a plan of execution for contraction, and that Alpha 
has no indication it is even in jeopardy of losing the team.  Had Alpha been 
informed of the possibility of contraction, the city would have been free to 
contemplate its move – whether to undertake the overhaul of the stadium in 
hopes that another team would come along, or redirect those funds elsewhere to 
other needs in the community. 
     There is an argument for MLB that Alpha has the ability to subsequently 
mitigate their potential loses by bringing on another team to fill the stadium.  
While this is true, the extent of mitigation does not allow Alpha to recoup its 
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investment and projected profits that come from having an affiliated team in the 
city.  As was shown earlier in this article, there is a drastic difference between 
attendance and, consequently, revenue between an independent league team and 
an MLB affiliated MiLB team.  There would be no immediate impact of 
mitigation from an unaffiliated team felt by Alpha.  Thus, it is possible for Alpha 
to show that the injury resulting from MLB contraction could not reasonably be 
avoided. 
     This section has shown that, while admittedly fact specific, it is possible for 
the FTC to bring a claim on behalf of Alpha under the unfairness doctrine of 
Section 5 FTCA for unfair or deceptive trade practices.  Now, the focus of this 
article will shift to an analysis under the second doctrine so provided by the 
federal statute. 
B. The Deceptive Doctrine Applied 
 
     There is no question that MLB is making a representation to Alpha through 
its communications.  Much like the Verity International Ltd. court found that 
defendants engaged in explicit and implicit representations, there is no question 
here that MLB has made explicit representations to Alpha regarding the 
guarantee of an affiliated team pending stadium redesign and reconstruction.  
Thus, a representation has been made.   
     This representation is likely to mislead Alpha’s city officials because of its 
falsity, in addition to it being made without a reasonable basis with some 
recognizable substantiation for the representation.  According to the 
hypothetical facts, there is a widely held belief internally at MLB that 
contraction is inevitable to the point that there is a plan currently in motion for 
its execution.  In stating that Alpha is guaranteed a team if they adhere to the 
approved plans for stadium redesign and reconstruction, the representation 
MLB is making is false and without any reasonable basis.  Thus, the 
representation is likely to mislead. 
     Furthermore, this representation is material because it affects Alpha’s 
decision to proceed with the overhaul of its current stadium in reliance on 
MLB’s assurances that doing so will yield in the award of an affiliated team.  
Absent these assurances, there is no telling whether Alpha would have 
proceeded with dedicating funds to a stadium overhaul, rather than dedicating 
those funds to other projects around the city. 
     MLB is being deceptive in that Alpha is being forced to bear a larger risk of 
recouping its investment and projected profits in the absence of having a MiLB 
team play its games in the city.  There is no telling whether a new team will 
even be formed or come to Alpha in place of the MLB-promised MiLB team, 
making it a possibility that the stadium sits idly with no occupant, resulting in 
serious financial loss to Alpha.  Thus, in light of the facts of this hypothetical, 
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MLB contraction meets the standards set forth in the deceptive doctrine under a 
Section 5 FTCA analysis for unfair or deceptive trade practices. 
CONCLUSION 
     Through an application of the facts, it has been illustrated how a city can 
prevail on a FTCA Section 5 claim for unfair or deceptive acts or trade practices.  
The applicability of the statute to a hypothetical scenario was the goal of this 
article, and that goal has been achieved.  It must be noted, however, that the 
applicability of Section 5 of the FTCA is very fact-specific and will not apply 
to every similar situation.  Further, what was not discussed is the damages cities 
can expect after prevailing on a Section 5 claim.  Stated earlier, the primary 
purpose of Section 5 of the FTCA is the protection of the consumer public.  
Apart from the diamond and the bright lights, baseball is still a business, and 
should be treated as such.  As such, that makes fans and cities lobbying to bring 
in team consumers.  Even in the game of baseball, the FTC can leave its impact 
and protect the “little guy” against MLB and its economically driven directives. 
     What this means for cities is that there is a potential for relief in the face of 
MLB contraction that cities will have at their disposal, should MLB make its 
ultimate decision and contract forty-two minor league teams.  However, given 
the current state of the sports in the world amid the novel Covid-19 pandemic, 
the primary focus of leagues is on the re-start of professional, major league-level 
competition.  So, while the possibility, or even inevitability, or MLB contraction 
of the minor leagues remains an issue that will have drastic effects, the focus for 
not only sports, but the world as a whole, is to slowly heal and return to a state 
of normalcy.  For minor league cities, there is hope amidst the chaos. 
 
 
